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Abstract
We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979),
but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the
optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strate-
gic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical
evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets.
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1 Introduction
Debt contracts are ubiquitous in financial markets. The classic Townsend (1979) considers
a setting where a project is financed by an outside investor, and the subsequent cash flow
is observable only to the borrower. Townsend shows that if monitoring is contractible
and deterministic, debt contracts are optimal. Under the optimal contract, the investor
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monitors (or liquidates) upon a default, and defaults by the borrower are driven purely
by lack of liquidity.
This paper considers optimal contracts and repayment/monitoring behavior in a mod-
ified Townsend setting where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic.
We find that the optimal contract is a debt contract. Under the optimal contract, the
borrower strategically defaults (i.e., oﬀers the investor a partial repayment even with suf-
ficient funds to repay in full) and the investor is lenient towards defaults (i.e., less than
certain monitoring upon defaults by the borrower) in equilibrium.
Our finding that debt is optimal adds to the literature exploring optimal contracting
under repayment frictions. Our finding that debt incurs strategic defaults and creditor
leniency fits well with the empirical corporate finance literature on repayment behavior in
credit markets, such as Brown et al., (2003), Esty and Megginson (2003), and Davydenko
(2005). For example, in a broad sample of firms, Davydenko (2005) finds that about 70%
of defaulting firms are not liquidated.
The intuition behind our results can be understood from the following figure.
2
Cash flow
Offered
Repayment
r1(x)
r* (x)
A B C
F
x
E
r2(x)
Figure 1
The figure depicts the cash flow x (known only to the manager) on the horizontal axis
and the dollar amount oﬀered in payment to the investor on the vertical axis. The bold
line depicts the optimal repayment function r∗(x) (how to implement r∗(x) is discussed
below). r∗(x) follows the feasibility barrier F for x in regionA and gives a constant payout
in regions B and C. We now argue that r∗(x) must beat alternative payment functions,
such as r1(x), by having lower monitoring costs. To make a comparison between r∗(x)
and r1(x) interesting, assume that r∗(x) and r1(x) induce the same aggregate payment to
the investor. Note first that to induce any non-constant r(x), the investor needs to more
likely monitor the lower the payment. At the level of maximal payment the monitoring
probability is zero. Given these observations, let us compare the monitoring costs for
r∗(x) and for r1(x) in the regions A, B, C. In C, the investor receives his maximal
payout under both r∗(x) and r1(x) and does not have incentives to monitor in either
case. Judged from this region alone, r∗(x) and r1(x) are equally good. In B, r∗(x) oﬀers
the maximal payout, and incurs no monitoring, while r1(x) pays less than its maximal
payout and therefore must imply some monitoring by the investor (if not, the manager
would never oﬀer the maximal payout). Therefore r∗(x) beats r1(x) in B. In A, r∗(x)
must also beat r1(x), because r∗(x) oﬀers more than r1(x) (more precisely, r∗(x) has a
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lower proposed writedown than r1(x), where the proposed writedown equals the maximal
payout subtracted the payment oﬀer). Thus r∗(x) dominates r1(x) in all regions A, B,
and C, and must therefore beat r1(x). Now consider a payment scheme r2(x), which
crosses the line F= x− c (where c is the cost of monitoring) and enters the area E, and
note that it is not feasible. If the manager plays r2(x), it would be strictly optimal for
the investor to not monitor following payments in E; by monitoring he gets at most x− c,
while by accepting the payment oﬀer he gets more. But then an equilibrium with r2(x)
would unravel, and cannot exist.
This argument gives intuition for why the optimal payment function r∗(x) is flat for
high cash flows and pays ”as much as possible” for low cash flows. It does not take much
imagination to guess that r∗(x) can be implemented with a debt contract, which is indeed
also the case. Note that the argument also gives intuition for why strategic defaults occur
in equilibrium. Interpreting (as it turns out correctly) the maximal payout of r∗(x) as
the contractual debt obligation, we see that the borrower defaults on debt in the upper
interval of A, where he in fact has suﬃcient funds to repay debt in full but chooses not
to do so.
Several papers have modified the Townsend (1979) basic assumptions that monitoring
is contractible and deterministic. Townsend (1979) showed with an example that a (non-
debt) contract with stochastic monitoring dominates a debt contract with deterministic
monitoring. Border & Sobel (1987), Mokherjee and Png (1989), and Boyd & Smith (1994)
show that optimal contracts under these conditions, i.e., stochastic but non-contractible
monitoring, tend to involve some forgiveness of the contractual obligation, but there is
no guarantee that the optimal contract will be debt-like. In an important paper, Krasa
& Villamil (2000) allow for stochastic monitoring and assume that monitoring is non-
contractible. Their solution is surprisingly similar to Townsend’s in that debt contracts
are optimal, and the equilibrium payment and monitoring behavior is also essentially the
same. Krasa-Villamil (2000) require equilibrium contracts to be ”time consistent” (their
equation (1.4)), meaning that optimal contracts need to be immune to renegotiation at
the interim stage (after the entrepreneur has made a payment oﬀer but before the investor
has decided whether to monitor). Time consistency implies deterministic monitoring in
equilibrium; if the investor is indiﬀerent between monitoring and not monitoring for some
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payment oﬀer, as must be the case for stochastic monitoring to occur in an equilibrium,
there would be mutual gains from ”bribing” the investor to refrain from it.1 Such bribes
are possible through rewriting the contract. We study a closely related problem to Krasa
& Villamil (2000) in that we allow stochastic monitoring and assume that monitoring
is non-contractible. We diﬀer, however, in not requiring time consistency (we rule out
interim renegotiation of contracts) and as a result get stochastic monitoring under the
optimal contract. The other diﬀerence to Krasa & Villamil (2000) is that we require the
payment to be continuous in the underlying cash flow. This assumption means that we
can employ diﬀerentiation techniques to solve our problem. Other related papers include
Hvide & Leite (2005) who derives the optimal mix of debt and equity in a setting without
commitment and allowing for random monitoring. Their pure debt equilibria have the
same structure as the equilibria in the present paper, but Hvide & Leite (2005) does not
derive optimal contracts. Gale & Hellwig (1989) analyze a similar payment game to in
the present paper and derive necessary conditions for the existence of signalling equilibria
that are broadly consistent with the equilibria of the present paper, but do not derive
optimal contracts. In Section 1, we set up the model and Section 2 contains the results.
Section 3 concludes.
2 Model
There are two risk-neutral agents, an entrepreneur and an investor. The penniless en-
trepreneur is endowed with a project that requires I units of funding to yield the cash
flow x. The cash flow is stochastic with density h(.) defined on X = [xL, xH ]. In return
for providing I, the investor gets a claim on x. This claim is a function f : X → <.
We make the feasibility restriction f(x) ≤ x, ∀x ∈ X, and denote the set of contracts
satisfying it for F .2 After being funded, x is generated and observed only by the entre-
preneur. The entrepreneur makes a payment oﬀer r to the investor, where the payment
1The time consistency requirement of Krasa-Villamil (2000) implies that monitoring can occur in equi-
librium only when the entrepreneurs lacks liquidity. In other words, time consistency rules out strategic
defaults.
2Note that we depart slightly from Krasa & Villamil (2000) in allowing the claim only to depend on
x, and not on the payment oﬀer r. This has no impact on our results.
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function r(x) is a mapping r : X → < with the restriction r ≤ x. We consider determin-
istic3 and absolutely continuous payment functions r(x), which implies that its derivative
r0(x) exists almost everywhere. The set of payment functions satisfying these criteria is
denoted by R. The investor accepts or rejects the oﬀer r based on his posterior beliefs
h0. If the investor accepts, he receives r, and the manager gets the residual x − r. If
the investor rejects/monitors, he receives a payoﬀ y according to the written contract,
i.e., y = min[f(x), x − c], and the manager gets the residual. Note that implicit in this
formulation the cost of monitoring c is taken from the firm’s cash flow (our results do not
depend upon this assumption). The investor’s accept probability function is a mapping
P : <→ [0, 1]. To ensure suﬃcient liquidity to cover the monitoring cost, we assume that
c ≤ xL. To make the problem interesting, we finally assume that an r(x) that gives a
constant payout on X falls short of making the investor willing to participate.
Let e = 1 if the investor rejects/monitors and e = 0 if the investor accepts an oﬀer.
The payoﬀ functions πi, where i = I, E are then given by,
πE = (1− e)(x− r) + e(x− y) = x− (1− e)r − ey (1)
πI = (1− e)r + ey
For a given strategy tuple hr(x), P (r)i the expected payoﬀs are given by,
EπE =
Z
X
[P (r(x))(x− r) + (1− P (r(x))(x− y − c)]dH (2)
EπI =
Z
X
[P (r(x))r + (1− P (r(x))y]dH
The investor participation constraint emerges from setting EπI = I. The basic trade-
oﬀs are as follows. The manager makes a payment oﬀer to the investor trading oﬀ the
gains from cash diversion with cost of an increased probability of monitoring (and hence
reducing the net payoﬀ via reducing the cash flow). The investor follows a monitoring
3There are technical problems in defining mixed strategies for a continuous type space. Barring such
problems, we conjecture that a mixed repayment strategy is not consistent with equilibrium (in contrast
to in Persons, 1997, which operates with a finite type space). The intuition is that a continuous X pins
down a unique accept probability function P (.), which in turn makes only one repayment oﬀer optimal
for given hf(x), xi. Martimort & Stole (2002) makes a similar observation in a diﬀerent context.
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strategy that balances oﬀ the cost of monitoring against the possible gain from detecting
a diversion attempt by the manager. We focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of
the payment game. That a tuple hr(x), P (r), h, h0i is a PBE means that a)P (r) is optimal
play by the investor given his posterior beliefs h0, b)The manager anticipates the investor’s
behavior and chooses r to maximize his payoﬀ, and c)The investor’s posterior beliefs are
formed using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
The implementation problem can be formulated as,
Problem 1 (3)
Maxhr(.),P (.)iEπE
s.t. EπI = I
r(x) ∈ R
f(x) ∈ F
Strategies and beliefs are PBE
Problem 1 amounts to finding the payment function and monitoring probabilities that
maximize the expected utility of the entrepreneur given the incentive constraints. Prob-
lem 1 is equivalent to finding a contract f(x) that minimizes the expected monitoring
(verification) cost V =
R
X
(1− P (.))dH subject to the investor’s participation constraint.
Let us define a debt contract as,
fD(x) = min(x, d) (4)
This contract entitles the investor to the full cash flow up to a point d, and then a constant
payout.
3 Analysis
The main result of the paper is as follows.
Theorem 1 (i)The optimal contract is a debt contract. (ii)Under the optimal contract,
the investor is lenient with defaults and the manager defaults strategically.
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We prove the theorem in several steps. Since the investor cannot precommit to a
monitoring strategy, the revelation principle does not hold, and we have to apply a more
indirect method of proof.4 The strategy of the proof is to solve a simplified version of
Problem 1 and then show that the solution also solves Problem 1.
First some definitions. Let Γ(f) be the set of PBE induced by a contract f(x) ∈ F . We
say that the payment function r(x) is inducable (implementable) if there exists f(x) ∈ F
such that r(x) is contained in Γ(f). Let x˜ be some arbitrary constant on X and denote
by B (where B ⊂ R) the set of payment functions satisfying (i)r0(x) > 0 for x ∈ [xL, x˜]
and (ii)r0(x) = 0. B contains all continuous payment functions that are either strictly
increasing on X or initially strictly increasing and then flat.
Now define Problem 1’ as Problem 1 except r(x) ∈ B is substituted in for r(x) ∈ R in
(3). We start out by solving Problem 1’ and then show that the solution to Problem 1’
is also a solution to Problem 1. The method we use to solve Problem 1’ is the standard
one of first finding the cheapest way to induce an arbitrary r(x) ∈ B and then find the
optimal r(x). We first note the following.
Lemma 1 For any r(x) ∈ B to be inducable, it must satisfy r(x) ≤ x− c, ∀x ∈ X.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that r(x) ∈ R is strictly
increasing on X. Suppose that there exists a contract fˆ(x) ∈ F that induces a r(x) with
r(x) > x − c on some interval X 0 = [x1, x2]. Since fˆ(x) ≤ x by feasibility we must have
that r(x) > fˆ(x) − c on X 0. But then the investor would accept oﬀers on [r(x1), r(x2)]
with probability 1. In that case, the entrepreneur never oﬀers more than r(x1) on X 0,
which contradicts the assumption that r(x) is strictly increasing. To extend the proof to
the case where r(x) is flat at the top is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 1 limits the set of feasible payment functions in B to lie below the line F in
Figure 1.
Lemma 2 For any inducable r(x) ∈ B, (i)The contract f∗(x) = r(x) + c induces r(x).
(ii)The associated accept probability function is P (r) = e
r−r(xH )
c . (iii)f∗(x) is the cheapest
4Bester & Strausz (2001) show that a modified version of the revelation principle holds under limited
commitment. Since we operate in a setting with a continous type space, their results do not immediately
apply.
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way to induce r(x).
Proof. Fix r(x) ∈ B and suppose that the contract is f∗(x) = r(x) + c. Since
r(x) ≤ x−c by Lemma 1, clearly f∗(x) ∈ F . We show that f∗(x) induces r(x). Note that
if the manager adheres to r(x), the investor is indiﬀerent to monitoring or not since r = y.
Given that the manager plays r(x), any P (r) is therefore consistent with optimal play
by the investor (given h0 appropriately defined). We now construct P (r) such that the
manager does not have incentives to deviate from r(x). Since the ensuing P (r) is unique,
we thereby prove both (i) and (ii). For given x, the expected payoﬀ for the manager from
oﬀering r equals,
UE(r) = P (r)(x− r) + (1− P (r))(x− f∗(x)) (5)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to r, we get
U 0E(r) = P
0(r)(x− r)− P − P 0(r)(x− f∗(x)) (6)
= P 0(r)(f∗(x)− r)− P
For r(x) to be optimal play by the manager, it must be a local maximum for all x,
P 0(r)c− P (r) = 0 (7)
The unique solution to this diﬀerential equation (barring the trivial solution P (x) = 0)
is P (r) = Ke
r
c , where K is an integration constant. Invoking the corner condition
P (r(xH)) = 1 (the investor accepts the maximal oﬀer with probability 1) and simplifying,
P (r) = e
r−r(xH )
c (8)
P (r) is increasing and convex in r. Note that the associated monitoring probability 1−P
lies between zero and one for all r. To show that adhering to r(x) is a global optimum
9
for the manager, observe that P 0(r) =
P (r)
c
. Substituting into U 0E(r),
U 0E(r) = P
0(r)(f∗(x)− r)− P (9)
= P (r)[
f∗(x)− r
c
− 1]
= P (r)[f∗(x)− c− r]/c
This expression is negative for r > f∗(x) − c and positive for r < f∗(x) − c. Hence
r(x) = f∗(x) − c is a global optimum for the manager. To complete the proof of (i)
and (ii), we need to construct beliefs that support this separating equilibrium. The
prior of the investor is that x follows h(x). For an oﬀer r on the equilibrium path, the
investor’s posterior beliefs h0 are degenerate at r + c for r < r(xH), and unrestricted for
r = r(xH). These posterior beliefs are obviously consistent with the manager’s strategy.
We do not need to restrict the investor’s posterior beliefs for oﬀers outside the interval
[r(xL), r(xH)]; for any posterior beliefs with support X it will be optimal for the investor
to accept r > r(xH) and optimal to reject r < r(xL). We have then proved (i) and (ii).
We now need to show (iii) that there are no cheaper ways to induce an arbitrary
r(x) ∈ B. We show that a contract fˆ(x) where fˆ(x) 6= r(x) + c for some interval(s) on
X must be suboptimal. We initially assume that r(x) is strictly increasing on X. Now,
since fˆ(x) 6= r(x) + c for some interval(s) on X, there must exist constants x1 and x2
such that fˆ(x) > r(x) + c or fˆ(x) < r(x) + c for x ∈ X 0 = [x1, x2] ⊂ X. For convenience
assume that fˆ(x) = f∗(x) for x /∈ X 0 (the logic of the proof is the same if this condition
does not hold). First let fˆ(x) < r(x) + c on X 0. This implies that r(x) > fˆ(x) − c
on X 0 and the investor would set P (r) = 1 for r ∈ [r(x1), r(x2)]. But in that case the
manager would oﬀer r(x1) for all x ∈ X 0, which is inconsistent with r(x) being strictly
increasing. Now let fˆ(x) > r(x) + c on X 0. Then the investor would set P (r) = 0 for
r ∈ [r(x1), r(x2)], since y > r. For the manager to have incentives to follow r(x) for
x ∈ [xL, x1] it follows immediately that P (r) = 0 for r ∈ [r(xL), r(x1)]. Now consider
the interval [x2, xH ]. Since fˆ(x) = f∗(x) for x ∈ [x2, xH ], by the same argument as in
the first part of the proof we must have that P (x) = er(x)−r(xH) for x ∈ [x2, xH ]. Let us
now compare the monitoring costs induced by fˆ(x) with the monitoring costs induced by
f∗(x), assuming that fˆ(x) induces r∗(x). For x ∈ [x2, xH ], the accept probability is the
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same for every x, and the expected monitoring cost of fˆ(x) and f∗(x) on [x2, xH ] must
be the same. For x ∈ [xL, x2], however, the monitoring costs induced by fˆ(x) must be
strictly higher than the monitoring costs by f∗(x), since f∗(x) induces investor lenience
while under fˆ(x) the investor monitors with probability 1 for x ∈ [xL, x2]. It follows
immediately that f∗(x) dominates fˆ(x), and consequently f∗(x) is the optimal contract
to induce r(x). We initially made the assumption that fˆ(x) = f∗(x) for x /∈ X 0. The
proof in the case where fˆ(x) 6= f∗(x) on more than one interval is a simple extension and
omitted. We also initially made the assumption that r(x) is strictly increasing on X. The
proof of the case where r(x) is flat in the upper region is also a simple extension, and
omitted.
We have shown that f∗(x) = r(x) + c is the optimal contract to induce a r(x) ∈ B
that satisfies the feasibility condition in Lemma 1. Equipped with Lemma 1 and Lemma
2 we can replace Problem 1’ with an equivalent and more manageable Problem 1”. Let
us denote by B0 the set of payment functions in B that satisfies the condition in Lemma
1.
Problem 1” (10)
Maxhr(.)i
Z
er(x)−r(xH)dH
s.t. EπI = I
r(x) ∈ B0
f(x) ∈ F
Strategies and beliefs are PBE
To obtain Problem 1” from Problem 1’, we have substituted in r(x) ∈ B0 for r(x) ∈ B by
Lemma 1, and P (r) = e
r−r(xH )
c by Lemma 2. Moreover, since Lemma 2 enables us to map
r(x) into P (r), observe that we now maximize over only r(x) instead of over hr(.), P (.)i
as in Problem 1’. Informally speaking, Problem 1” is the problem depicted in Figure 1.
Now define D = [xL,m+ c) and E = [m+ c, xH ]. Clearly D ∪E = X and D ∩E = ∅.
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Lemma 3 The solution to Problem 1” is r∗(x), where
r∗(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
x− c
m
for
x ∈ D
x ∈ E
(11)
Proof. r∗(x) follows the feasibility barrier r(x) ≤ x − c and then becomes flat for
x = m+c (as depicted in Figure 1). To prove (i), let rˆ(x) ∈ B0 be an arbitrary alternative
payment function in B0 that raises the same amount as r∗, i.e.,
R
X
rˆ(x)dH =
R
X
r∗(x)dH
(recall that one example of an rˆ(x) is r1(x) depicted in Figure 1). Recall that for an
arbitrary rˆ(x), its expected monitoring cost equals
R
X
c[1 − P (rˆ(x))dH. Let Vˆ be the
expected monitoring cost of rˆ(x) and V ∗ be the expected monitoring cost of r∗(x). To show
that r∗(x) solves Problem 1” is equivalent to showing that Vˆ > V ∗. In the following we
show that Vˆ ≥ V ∗. To extend the proof to holding for strict inequality is straightforward
and omitted. Denote the expected monitoring cost of r∗(x) on D (E) for V ∗D (V ) and
the expected monitoring cost of rˆ(x) on D (E) for VˆD (VˆE). By definition, VˆD + VˆE = Vˆ
and V ∗D + V
∗
E = V
∗. r∗(x) = r(xH) for x ∈ E implies V ∗E = 0 and therefore V ∗E ≤ VˆE.
It therefore suﬃces to prove that V ∗D ≤ VˆD. Since r∗(x) = x − c for x ∈ D, Lemma
1 implies r∗(x) ≥ rˆ(x) for x ∈ D. Recall from Lemma 2 that for an arbitrary rˆ(x) we
have P (rˆ(x)) = e
rˆ(x)−rˆ(xH )
c . To show that V ∗D ≤ VˆD it is therefore suﬃcient to show that
rˆ(xH) ≥ r∗(xH). Since r∗(x) ≥ rˆ(x) for x ∈ D, we have that
R
D
r∗(x)dH ≥
R
D
rˆ(x)dH.
Therefore
R
E
rˆ(x)dH ≥
R
E
r∗(x)dH must hold for the investor to be indiﬀerent between
r∗(x) and rˆ(x). But since r∗0(x) = 0 for x ∈ E, there must exist a constant x˜ ∈ E
such that rˆ(x) ≥ (≤)r∗(x) for x > (<)x˜. Therefore rˆ(xH) ≥ r∗(xH). Note finally that
by adjusting m we can satisfy any feasible investor participation constraint (it is easy to
show that r∗(x) maximizes the range of fundable projects). That completes the proof.
We have shown that r∗(x) solves Problem 1” and now show that fD(x) is the optimal
contract inducing r∗(x).
Lemma 4 fD(x) induces r∗(x) and is the cheapest way to induce it.
Proof. That fD(x) induces r∗(x) follows from Lemma 2, part (i). That fD(x) is
optimal in inducing r∗(x) follows from Lemma 2, part (iii).
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We have showed that r∗(x) is optimal in B and that a debt contract is optimal in in-
ducing r∗(x). It follows directly that the manager defaults strategically under the optimal
contract since for x ∈ [xL,m+c] the contractual obligation is x, while the actual payment
oﬀer equals x − c. Also, the creditor is lenient towards defaults, since his monitoring
probability 1− P is less than unity for any equilibrium path default. We have therefore
proven Theorem 1 under the limitation r(x) ∈ B. That payment functions not in B
cannot be optimal is intuitively straightforward but formally quite tedious, and relegated
to the appendix.
Lemma 5 Any r(x) /∈ B must be dominated by r∗(x).
We have then proved Theorem 1. Let us consider an example to highlight the economic
behavior induced by the optimal contract. All qualitative features of the example hold
generally.
Example 1 Let c = 1 and x be uniformly distributed on [1,2].
The contract is fD(x) = min(x, d) which implies that the manager plays r(x) =
min(x − c, d). The manager defaults for x ∈ [xL, d + c), a purely strategic default for
x ∈ [d, d + c) and partly strategic, partly liquidity-based for x ∈ [xL, d). The creditor
monitors according to P (r) = e
r−r(xH )
c ; the higher payment, the lower probability for
monitoring, and the higher maximal amount, the more monitoring. Since r(xH) − r
can be interpreted as a writedown proposal by the manager, the accept probability is
decreasing and concave in the magnitude of the writedown proposal.5 Substituting in
for r(x) we get P (r) = min(e
x−c−d
c , 1). The investor’s participation constraint simplifies
to
R d+c
xL
(x − c)dx +
R xH
d+c
mdx = I, which substituting in for c = 1 and solving gives
d = 1−
√
1− 2I. We can note that d is (increasing and) convex in I.
The maximum fundable amount is obtained for D = xH − c = 2 − 1 = 1, in which
case the investor’s payoﬀ becomes
R
X
(x − c)dH =
R 2
1
(x − 1)dx = 1/2. Hence in this
5The intuition for concavity is that when r is low then P (.) is low and the gains from cheating is small
simply because the probability of getting away with it is low. On the other hand the loss from cheating is
proportional in P 0(.). The only way to induce adherence to r(x) is therefore for the cheating deterrence
to be stronger the higher r, or in other words for P 0(.) to be higher for higher r.
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example any I ∈ [0, .5] is obtainable from the investor. The literature on bankruptcy
costs (e.g., Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) finds that bankruptcy costs are about 10-30% of
bankrupt firms’ value. Interpreting c as bankruptcy costs, the example generates expected
bankruptcy costs E(c/x|e = 1) within these bounds for I ∈ [0.15, 0.37].
We can calculate the gain in utility for the manager from defaulting strategically by
playing r∗(x) rather than adhering to the written contract by playing r(x) = min(x, d).
For x ∈ [xL, d) the gain equals (x − r)P (r(x)) = ce
x−xH
c , which increases in x. For
x ∈ [d, d+c) the gain equals (d−r)P (r(x)) = (d−x+c)P (r(x)) = (d−x+c)e
x−xH
c which
decreases in x. Therefore the expected gain for the manager is concave and maximized
for x = d. The economic implication is that under the optimal contract, the expected
priority violation is maximized when the manager is closer to solvency, which is consistent
with empirical evidence from Betker (1995).
Finally, as noted by Hvide & Leite (2005), the interest rate, d/I − 1, as spread over
the riskfree rate increases in (i)the funding requirement I, and in (ii)the riskiness of the
cash flow, under the optimal contract. An implication is that riskier firms on average face
less lenient investors in default, as seen from the fact that a greater d implies a higher
monitoring probability.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In this section we summarize and then discuss two crucial assumptions.
We have solved for optimal contracts and payment behavior in a modified Townsend
setting where monitoring is non-contractible and stochastic monitoring is allowed. We
found that the optimal contract is a debt contract. Under the optimal contract, the
borrower strategically defaults on his payment obligation and the investor is lenient to-
wards defaults. Our finding that debt is optimal adds to the literature exploring optimal
contracts under repayment frictions in financial markets. Our findings that debt incurs
strategic defaults and creditor leniency fit well with the corporate finance literature on
repayment behavior of debt in real financial markets. In fact influential papers such as
Anderson & Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barall & Perraudin (1997) argue that strategic
defaults are a main reason for why observed risk premia on debt exceeds that implied by
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the hugely influential Merton (1974) debt valuation model. We therefore believe that our
solution match real-world contracts and repayment behavior fairly well.
We have made two main departures from Krasa & Villamil (2000); that renegotiation
of contracts is not allowed (i.e., we do not require ”time consistency”) and that payment is
continuous in the underlying cash flow. One way to defend our no-renegotiation assump-
tion is that renegotiation would impose an ex-ante cost — through restricting the feasible
utilities or simply through lawyer fees or delays in coming to agreement in the interim —
that the parties impede in the initial contract. A diﬀerent type of defense is the Segal
& Whinston (2002) argument that which commitment assumptions to employ should be
motivated by which assumptions produce the more realistic solution. Given the emphasis
on strategic defaults and investor leniency in the corporate finance literature we feel that
our assumptions fare well in this respect. The second departure from Krasa & Villamil
(2000) is our requirement that the payment function is continuous, which allows for use
of diﬀerentiation techniques.6 A simple ”trembling” argument defends the continuity re-
quirement. Suppose that the manager may tremble slightly when making his payment
oﬀer, so that the actual payment oﬀer equals a distorted version of the equilibrium pay-
ment. This might be because of bounded rationality by the manager (or by the investor),
because of rounding, or because of random mistakes by an intermediary. The diﬀerence
to the payment game without trembles is that all payments occur with positive density in
equilibrium. For suﬃciently small trembles, r∗(x) is still the optimal continuous payment
function. More interestingly, there cannot exist an equilibrium with a discontinuous r(x).
To see why, suppose that r(x) is continuous except in (countably) many points. Consider
one of these points and label it y ∈ X. Then r(y−) > r(y+), where ”−” topscript denotes
left limit and ” + ” topscript denotes right limit. Suppose that a payment oﬀer r(y−) + δ
is observed, where δ is small relative to r(y+)− r(y−). Then the investor will conjecture
that the oﬀer was made by a type on the interval [xL, y−]. But in that case, for suﬃciently
small trembles, the investor will strictly prefer to accept the oﬀer r(y−) + δ. But then
the oﬀer r(y−) will never be made in equilibrium and an equilibrium with a discontinuous
6If we allow for discontinuous schemes, we would have an identical implementation problem to them,
except for their added time consistency constraint. Obviously, then, we can obtain a higher entrepreneur
payoﬀ than Krasa-Villamil (2000).
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payment function cannot exist.
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6 Appendix
Here we prove that any r(x) /∈ B must be dominated (Lemma 5). We split the proof into
two parts. First we show that (i)r(x) /∈ B with r(x) ≤ x − c must be dominated, and
then that (ii)r(x) /∈ B with r(x) > x− c for some interval on X must be dominated.
To prove (i), denote a candidate payment function by rˆ(x). First suppose that rˆ(x) is
weakly increasing. By the same construction as in Lemma 1, rˆ(x) should be implemented
by f(x) = rˆ(x) + c, and the only accept probability function consistent with rˆ(x) being
part of a PBE is P (x) = e
rˆ(x)−rˆ(xH )
c . But then exactly the same dominance argument
as in Lemma 1 shows that r∗(x) dominates rˆ(x). Suppose instead that rˆ(x) is strictly
decreasing on some interval(s). Again, by the same construction as in Lemma 1, the
only accept probability function consistent with rˆ(x) being part of a PBE is e
rˆ(x)−rˆ(xu)
c ,
where xu = argmax{x} rˆ(x). If xu = xH , the proof goes through by the same dominance
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argument as before. Let us therefore suppose that xu < xH . We now construct an
alternative payment function r¯(x) through modifying rˆ(x) and show that r¯(x) constructed
in a suitable manner dominates rˆ(x). We assume for convenience that there exists x0 so
that r¯(x) reaches a local minimum for x0.7 We construct r¯(x) in two steps. In step
1, let r¯(x) = r(xu) − δ in an ²-neighborhood of xu, labeled XA. ² is small enough to
guarantee that r¯(x) pays less than rˆ(x) in XA, and δ defined to ensure continuity of
r¯(x) in the endpoints of XA. In step 2, perform a similar modification of r¯(x) in a
neighborhood of xu, but now ”shave” from below so that r¯(x) raises more than rˆ(x).
Formally, let r¯(x) = rˆ(xu) + ψ in an ²-neighborhood of xu labeled by XB. ψ is defined
to ensure continuity in the endpoints of XB. Let now ² be such that the investor is
indiﬀerent between r¯(x) and rˆ(x) (by the continuity of r¯(x) and rˆ(x) such ² exists). Let
us now compare the expected monitoring costs for r¯(x) and rˆ(x). In XA, the expected
monitoring cost for r¯(x) is zero, while greater than zero for rˆ(x). In XB, the monitoring
cost for r¯(x) is lower than for rˆ(x), since the payment is higher for r¯(x). Finally, outside
XA and XB, r¯(x) must also have a lower monitoring cost than rˆ(x), since the maximal
payout is higher for r¯(x) than for rˆ(x). Hence r¯(x) beats rˆ(x) and consequently any rˆ(x)
strictly decreasing on some interval(s) cannot be optimal.
We now need to show that (ii)r∗(x) beats any r(x) /∈ B with r(x) > x − c for some
interval on X. Denote a candidate payment function of this type by rˆ(x) and the set of
such functions by Rˆ, where Rˆ ⊂ R. The optimal payment function in Rˆ we denote by
rˆ∗(x). The strategy of the proof is to derive rˆ∗(x) and then show that r∗(x) beats rˆ∗(x)
by having lower monitoring costs. We first consider weakly increasing rˆ(x) in steps 1-7.
Step 1. A weakly increasing rˆ(x) ∈ Rˆ must have a constant payout for X 0 = [xL, t],
where t is some constant, since the same contradiction argument as eliminating r2(x) in
Figure 1 would otherwise apply. It follows that to find rˆ∗(x) we can restrict attention to
7If such a local minimum does not exist, rˆ(x) must either be weakly increasing (in which case it is
covered in the previous paragraph) or reach a local minimum for x = xH . The proof extends readily to
the latter case.
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rˆ(x) that are continuous approximations to ρˆ(x), where
ρˆ(x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
q
x− c
m
for
x ∈ [xL, t]
x ∈ [t,m+ c]
x ∈ [m+ c, xH ]
(12)
ρˆ(x) has constant payout q on X 0, then follows x− c, and flattens at x = m+ c.
Step 2. rˆ∗(x) must induce the investor to monitor stochastically on X 0: if it is strictly
optimal for the investor to accept q then rˆ(x) cannot be an equilibrium,8 and if it is strictly
optimal for the investor to monitor with probability 1 then rˆ(x) cannot be optimal. For
the investor to monitor stochastically on X 0 we must have that,Z
X0
qdH =
Z
X0
(f(x)− c)dH, which implies
q(H(t)−H(xL)) =
Z
X0
f(x)dH − cH(t), which simplifies to
q =
Z
X0
f(x)dH/H(t)− c (13)
On the left hand side is what the investor gets if he accepts an oﬀer q, and on the right
hand side is what he expects to get if he monitors.
Step 3. For any choice of contract f(x), equation (13) generates a function q(t),
where q(xL) = xL − c by L’Hospitals rule. By a straightforward dominance argument,
to find rˆ∗(x) we want to pick the northernmost q(t). This must arise from maximizingR
X0 f(x)dH on X
0 with respect to f(x), which is obtained by setting f(x) = f∗(x) = x
on X 0.
Step 4. Substituting f(x) = x back into (13), rˆ∗(x) must satisfy
q =
Z
X0
xdH/H(t)− c (14)
Note that
R
X0 xdH/H(t) = E(x|x ∈ X 0), where E(x|x ∈ X 0) is the conditional mean of x
8Recall the assumption that the scheme r(x) = q for x ∈ X does not satisfy the investor’s participation
constraint. Therefore, candidate schemes with payout q for x ∈ X 0 must have a higher payout for x /∈ X 0.
But if P (q) = 1, the manager would oﬀer q also for x /∈ X 0.
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on X 0. (14) implies that E(x|x ∈ X 0) = q + c, a fact that will be used in Step 7.
Step 5. Since
R
X0 xdH/H(t)− c =
R
X0(x− c)dH/H(t) =
R
X0 r
∗(x)dH/H(t), equation
(14) implies that rˆ∗(x) and r∗(x) gives the same aggregate investor payoﬀ onX 0. It follows
directly from (12) that rˆ∗(x) and r∗(x) must be identical on x ∈ X 0c (where X 0c = X/X 0)
i.e., rˆ∗(x) = r∗(x) for x ∈ X 0c. By Lemma 1, the accept probability and monitoring costs
of rˆ∗(x) and r∗(x) are therefore also identical for x ∈ X 0. To show that r∗(x) beats rˆ∗(x)
it is therefore suﬃcient to show that r∗(x) has a lower monitoring cost than rˆ(x) on X 0.
This is equivalent to showing that r∗(x) has a higher average accept probability than
rˆ∗(x).
Step 6. The average accept probability for r∗(x) on X 0 equals
R
X0 P
∗(x)dH/H(t),
where P ∗(x) = e
x−c−r∗(xH )
c . Since rˆ∗(x) has a constant payout on X 0, its average accept
probability simply equals P ∗(q) = e
q−r∗(xH )
c .9 We therefore need to show that
P ∗(q) ≤
Z
X0
P ∗(x)dH/H(t) (15)
Step 7. We now show that (15) holds strictly, except in the non-generic case where it
holds with equality. Note that the left hand side of (15) is unaﬀected by h(x). It is
therefore suﬃcient to show that (15) holds for the h(x) that maximizes the right hand
side subject to (13). Since both r∗(x) and rˆ(x) are linear in x, (13) will hold for any
distribution that keeps E(x|x ∈ X 0) constant, or in other words for any mean-preserving
shift of h(x) on X 0. Since H(t) is constant through mean-preserving shifts and P ∗(x) is
convex in x, the right hand side of (13) is maximized by minimizing risk, i.e., putting an
atom of the size H(t) at the point x = q+ c. Substituting into (15), we get the condition
e
q−r∗(xH )
c ≤ H(t)e
q−r∗(xH )
c /H(t) = e
q−r∗(xH )
c (16)
which always holds. Hence we have shown that r∗(x) dominates rˆ(x) strictly except in
the non-generic case where h(x) is a non-generate distribution.
We finally need to eliminate r(x) that have r(x) > x − c on some interval and is
9This is where the requirement that rˆ(x) is continuous bites. Allowing rˆ(x) to be discontinuous in the
point t would soften the incentive constraint of the manager, and decrease the monitoring probability for
the oﬀer q.
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strictly decreasing on some (possibly diﬀerent) interval. But this follows from the same
type of argument as in part (i): for any such decreasing r(x) we can construct an alter-
native payment function which pays more than r(x) in the region where r(x) is strictly
decreasing and less in a region around the point where r(x) is maximized, and show that
this alternative payment function must dominate r(x).
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